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Introduction
This paper explores the origins, growth and demise of
autocracy in poet-independence Zambia from a historical
perspective. It does BO from1 a macroscopic study of the
nature of the political orientation of the nationalist party
which secured a dominant electoral majority during the
transition from colonial rule to independence—the United
National Independence Party (UNIP), and its leadership from
1964 to 1991. The paper also explores society's perception of
nationalist leaders and how that perception contributed to the
emergence of autocracy in post-independence Zambia. The one-
party state system of government in Zambia, and indeed
elBewhere, was perceived as form of dictatorship. Yet,
scholars were merely content to comment on the shortcomings of
this system of government. Its origins were generally
explained away as part and parcel of the intransigence of
political parties which assumed political power at
independence. Little was said about the impact of the
colonial past and, indeed, the role of society in influencing
the political direction of post-Independent Zambia.
Crawford Young alluded to "the autocratic and hegemonic
impulses which were the more enduring legacy of the colonial
state," in his seminal work dealing with, inter alia, the
issue of the one-party rule.1 Yet, even in Young's work, the
role of the masses towards assisting the "radical,
mobilizational parties which secured a dominant electoral
1
2position under terminal colonial rule," in becoming
intransigent political monopolies waB not explored.2 This
paper suggests, with specific reference to Zambia during the
first and second republics, that politicians and the ordinary
citizenry participated in bringing about autocracy in the
country.
Larry Diamond and Dennis Galvan saw Zambia as an
authoritarian one-party state manifesting "somewhat greater
political freedom."3 Yet, in the absence of legally
constituted opposition parties, this freedom was largely a
fallacy. As S.E. Finer noted, "without the freedom of
association, it ie impossible to see how [people] can get
together in order to put up the candidates who represent their
opinions".4 In fact, lack of political freedom was the
frequently cited example of the many evils of one-party state
rule. As Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski pointed
out:
The truly distinguishing features is that the ruler
ie not responsible to anyone elee for what he does;
he is the autoa, who himself wields power; that is
to say, he makes the decisions and reaps the fruits
of them.6
There are six basic features which distinguish an autocracy
from a liberal democracy. By liberal democracy, we mean "a
political system characterized by regular and free elections
in which politicians organized into parties compete to form
the government, the right of virtually all adult citizens to
vote, and by guarantees of a range of familiar political and
civil rights."8 An autocratic political system, however, is
characterised by the following features: an official ideology;
a single mass party led typically by one man; a system of
3terroristic police control; a technologically conditioned
near-complete monopoly control of all meane of effective mass
communication, Buch as the press, radio and television; a
similarly technologically near-complete monopoly of control of
all means of effective armed combat; and central control and
direction of the entire economy through the bureaucratic co-
ordination of its formerly independent corporate entities.7
These features characterised Zambia's seventeen year one-party
state history.
Zambia's official ideology, for instance, was Humanism.
It was propounded and officially launched by President Kaunda
in 1965. The declaration of one-party state in 1972 against
protests from the African National Congress (ANC) was achieved
amid fears of harassment by the much dreaded Special Branch.
In the Zambian context, the Special Branch operated more or
leBB like the well known secret policy in European
dictatorships. According to former Lusaka Police Chief,
Mwenda Muyunda:
The special branch officers operated like people who
were above the law. These officers though falling
under the police had secret places where suspects
were interrogated without our knowledge.8
The "party and its government" in Zambia, aided by several
units of the state, had total control of mass communication,
it controlled and directed the economy through the
bureaucratic coordination provided by the Industrial
Development Corporation (INDECO) and the Zambia Industrial and
Mining Corporation (ZIMCO)^two corporations set up following
the 1965 and 1969 Economic Reforme. President Kaunda was
initially the Chairman of this pyramid of ultimate political
control of the economic activity.8
4UNIP wae formed in August 1959 ae an amalgam of the
United Freedom Party (UFP) and the African National
Independence Party (ANIP). Dixon Konkola wae its first
president. However, within weeks of UNIP'e formation, Konkola
was suspended and replaced by Paul Kallchini. Kalichini was
also replaced by Mainza Chona who, together with others, had
recently left the ANC. When Kenneth David Kaunda was released
from prison, fresh elections were held on 3l6t January 1960,
and Kaunda was elected national president. He remained the
leader of UNIP until 1992 when he finally retired from active
politics—of course following hiB electoral defeat in the 1991
presidential and parliamentary elections.10
Kaunda was generally considered the epitome of unity
because of his strong anti-tribal politics.11 He was the
only one in UNIP who did not have very strong tribal
affiliations. He wae born of Nyaealand (Malawi) parentage
among the Bemba of Chinsali in Northern Province. Ae such he
was seen as a good compromise leader of the new party. It is
plausible to suggest that other leaders may have initially
thought they could use his neutral identity to their enda.
Under Kaunda'e leadership, and because of itB policy of
immediate self-government and elections based on universal
suffrage, UNIP aoon emerged as the dominant African political
party. As early as 1963 Kaunda was already seeking national
unity through the Ideology of togetherness among Africans. On
20 October 1963, for example, he asked Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula,
leader of the African National Congress (ANC), to dissolve his
party and accept "an honourable and respectable" position in
public life.12 It is important to point out, however, that
5the ideology of togetherness among Africans first found
expression in Sikota Wina's confidential letter to Harry
Mwaanga Nkumbula in 1959. Writing to Nkumbula, Wina asked him
to:
...summon together the UNIP and ANC and declare that
you are moving higher in the African leadership
hierarchy and that you are prepared to declare unity
of all Africans under one banner, that of the ANC of
Northern Rhodesia. And that because of your pre-
occupation with Legco matters you will take the post
of National Guardian, leaving the entire
administration into the hands of a president elected
by both organisations.13
Kaunda was, therefore, asking Nkumbula what other UNIP leaders
had previouely requested Nkumbula to do. Nonetheless, this
request was repeated several times thereafter. It was
generally believed in UNIP circles that ANC was too
compromising and counter productive.
The country became the independent Republic of Zambia on
24 October 1964, after which the raleon d'etre for liberal
democracy disappeared. Two issues immediately began to
preoccupy the new UNIP government. First, UNIP was concerned
about ways and means of maintaining it political dominance
under a constitution which the departing colonial government
had deliberately designed to guarantee liberal democracy.
Since 1959 the country had operated a fragile multi-party
political system which maintained competitive pluralistic
institutions—a framework for power contest in the polity.
Secondly, this drive for continued political supremacy
was entwined with UNIP's search for national unity which, was
seen as the prerequisite for nation building. Consequently,
UNIP's quest to dominate the political scene was increasingly
articulated as a process aimed at national unity. President
6Kaunda argued that although nationalism had successfully
dislodged colonial rule, its future was uncertain because many
Africans lacked any notion of national identity—"their
loyalties were more restricted and fragmentary."*4
Undoubtedly, since ite formation in 1959, UNIP remained
essentially a coalition of various interest groups. It was
never a truly coherently inspired political party. It was
initially held together because of the strong desire by most
of ite followere, who saw in UNIP the only hope of diemantling
colonial rule. After independence, however, the various
interests polarised. Thus, as Cherry Gertzel and others
pointed out, "the most important level of political conflict,
however, was not between UNIP and ANC, but within UNIP
itself."i° A few months later, therefore, President Kaunda
openly stated that he favoured a one-party state, but that he
would let the people of Zambia decide.16 President Kaunda
considered a multi-party political system a luxury the new
state could not afford. He argued that multi-party politics
unnecessarily divided people, thus impeded nation-building and
national development. The ideology of togetherness wae once
again being pursued by the Kaunda regime. Uttered in the
1960s, these eentiments found many disciples and reflected the
general thinking in most newly independent African countries.
Analyzed from the perspective of the 1990s, however, the
desire for one-party state rule by UNIP leaders suggests a
deliberate strategy to dominate and sustain the UNIP
leadership in power. More importantly, perhaps, one-party
rule became the only surest way through which UNIP could
remain in power. The "snowball and bandwagon" model had
7clearly failed. This was manifested by UNIP's failure to
capture four seats in the Southern Province by-elections In
1968.17
RootB of AutocrsRV in Zambia
It is an established fact that in modern political
experience, dictators have been able to rule only if
the masses of their people have a fanatical faith in
the Leader Principle.18
Few can deny that at independence the masses (and
politicians as well) had "a fanatical faith in the Leader
Principle". Long before independence, Nkumbula was considered
the saviour by most Africans.10 It Is plausible to argue
that Wina's letter to Nkumbula in December 1959 was inspired
by similar feelings in order to "enhance [Nkumbula's] position
in the Legco...."20 Some even referred to him as
father.21 Thus the leader principle did not start with
President Kaunda, even though the rootB of autocracy in Zambia
can be attributed to the fanatical faith in the leadership of
President Kaunda. This was, obviously, further aided by the
fact that at independence in 1964 Zambia had not experienced a
long tradition of liberal democracy. The nature of colonial
rule made it easier for the new African leaders to become
autocratic.
Colonial rule in Zambia did not reflect the ideala of
liberal democracy as they then existed in the United Kingdom.
As J. S. Coleman pointed out, colonialism itself was
essentially "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in which
"politics, especially opposition politics, were barely
tolerated".22 Coleman's views echoed thoae of Northern
Rhodesia's (now Zambia) Chief Secretary who in 1935 pointed
8out that the Northern Rhodesian constitution did "not permit
of an opposition or formation of absurd parties...."23
Furthermore, "political parties are products of the western
democracies" and "were hardly an accepted part of the new way
of life of the various African societies when they gained
political independence."24 This comment by a South African
writer correctly mirrors the colonial view that Africans had
no democratic past upon which to build.
Yet, while pre-colonial political entities were diverse
in nature, through them all the theme or Bpirit of a
traditional type of liberalism pervaded in that rulers were
expected to be answerable to the people and could be removed
if they were not. As Kabunda Kayongo noted, "ancient people
in Africa did not take kindly to any form of tyranny."26 No
pre-European Zambian, ruler, therefore, was an autocrat in the
fashion of Shaka or kings of Rwanda, Buganda or Dahomey. If
some colonial chiefs acquired the attributes of autocracy, it
was precisely because colonial officials allowed them and even
gave them that kind of power. For seventy years, therefore,
Zambia did not experience any form of government remotely
resembling a democracy in its traditional or European form.
Thus, the roots of autocracy in post-independence Zambia can
be said to have origins in the nature of the colonial
political syetem which anathematized opposition parties. In
Zambia, therefore, autocracy should not, and can not, be
explained as part of the African heritage.
Consequently, at independence, neither UNIP nor the vast
majority of politicians were sufficiently prepared to nurture
liberal democracy which Britain had hurriedly put In place in
91958.2e It was no Burpriee therefore, that within a year of
Zambia's independence, President Kaunda, encouraged by
"popular demand" was already advocating the creation of a one-
party state. Furthermore, as he advocated the creation of a
one-party state, the Leader Principle was also developing
within UNIP for the reasons given above.
Zamblans Mould nn Autocrat
President Kaunda was not born an autocrat. Unlike many
African leaders in the 1960s, who favoured what amounted In
effect to one-man rule, he spent much of M B energies on the
constant task of keeping some semblance of consensus among hie
colleagues. However, policy differences, personality clashes
and sheer personal ambition among the key political players of
the day led to systematic changes in the body politic which
entrenched power in the presidency aB the supreme institution.
He was made an autocrat by the masses and fellow UNIP leaders
who individually and severally placed him above reproach.
This was aided by mounting tribal dissention in UNIP and the
growing administrative chaos in the governrnent machinery. In
response, therefore, President Kaunda took personal control of
a vaBt range of government activity. He brought Foreign
Affairs, the Civil Service, Defence and the running of the
country's major commercial and industrial enterprises under
hie wing.27 Already President Kaunda was being perceived as
one who was beyond ridicule.
A test case to this effect came before parliament in July
1965, barely a year after Zambia's independence. Edward
Mungoni Lieo, an ANC Member of Parliament for Namwala
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constituency, speaking in parliament on the Police Bill
intimated that President Kaunda, at a rally in Chipata, had
allegedly deplored the police for favouring the ANC. UN1P MPe
were up in arms against Liso. They accused him of misusing
hie parliamentary privileges and ridiculing the President.
Sikota Wina, who was then Minister of Local Government
and Housing and also UNIP Chief Whip in parliament, moved a
motion to suspend Liso from the house for "false and
unsubstantiated allegations concerning the conduct of His
Excellency the President".aa Wina continued thus:
It is ... going to be positive proof that not only
are we on this side [UNIP] not going to brook any
nonsense in the running of the this country, but
that once and for all the idea must be drummed home,
and I mean "drummed home', Mr. Speaker, that the
name of His Excellency the President of this
Republic must never be taken in vain.2"
Wina was not alone in the pursuit of "justice". Ackspn
Soko, who was then Resident Minister for the Eastern Province,
making his contribution to the motion to suspend Liso, eaid:
As far as I am concerned, I remember when I made as
mistake and apologised to my father, he said I have
to whip you and after that I will accept your
apology. This ie the African way of life. We have
to whip and then, probably the apology will be
accepted later on.30
Soko further wondered:
whether this western democracy is the right system
for this country. It is either we adopt African
democracy whereby only the headman has a eay, or the
chief has a say in that area, here we' allow
everybody, anywhere in the ... I think it ie time
that we took sterner measures ... This suspension
which is proposed, to me ie too lenient.31
Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, making his contribution to the motion
concurred with Soko and said:
When you make a mistake with your father, he whips
you, if you make the mistake with your mother, she
will whip you, or you may not have food. Thie is
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our philosophy, thie is our own foundation and we
are going to continue because it is right.32
Undoubtedly, the motion was meant to intimidate and place
President Kaunda beyond reproach. Little did Kapwepwe and
other UNIP leaders realize that they were creating a
personality cult around President Kaunda whereby hie name
became synonymous with "HiB Excellency the President".33
Kapwepwe further praised President Kaunda as "... the man
who listens to all complaints small and big from rich and
poor, the real humanitarian, a man that we may not find again
in our generation". And continued, "...The hon. member for
Namwala (Mr. Liso) should be punished for his untrue statement
in this House against His Excellency the President".34 Yet
another UNIP Minister, Solomon Kalulu, argued that because
Zambia's democracy was still at its Infancy, it wae
"improper, [and] fatal at this stage to criticise the
President because the President is a symbol of that undivided
unity of this young nation".30
Because parliament debated issues of this nature on
partisan lines, the motion was passed by 46 (UNIP) to 17 (ANC)
votee. Liso was subsequently suspended from parliament
despite having apologized to the Speaker. In retrospect, the
Liso case had serious implications for the future of liberal
democracy in Zambia. The motion to suspend Liso was less an
act of restoring the respectability of the Republican
President, but a deliberately calculated move to weaken the
opposition, both in and outside parliament. UNIP evidently
began to show signs that as a party it was against criticism,
particularly if that criticism was directed at the presidency.
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Inadvertently, the move contributed to the rise of UNIP'B
autocratic rule.
President Kaunda was thue created and defined by UNIP
politicians who Bought to control him and perhape use him to
their advantage. Unknowingly, the Kaunda image they created
became equated to that of the nation, and therefore above
them. It was too late when they realized that they had
created a "Frankenstein Monster". This crystallised in 1968
when President Kaunda briefly resigned as President of UNIP
and the Republic on 5 February.3S The reeponee by UNIP
politicians to this episode, in fact, turned President Kaunda
into a demi-god. It hae been observed that Alexander Gray
Zulu, tears in bis eyes urged President Kaunda to withhold hie
final decision until the following day.37 Nephas Tembo's
reaction was equally flattering of President Kaunda's
leadership. Tembo pointed out that:
My first thought following the shock of Ken's
resignation waB the security of my family who were
more than six hundred and forty kilometres away from
thi6 confusion....30
For both Zulu and Tembo, President Kaunda epitomised unity in
Zambia, hence the fear that his resignation would lead to
chaoB in the country—a theme which persisted until 1991 when
President Kaunda lost to President Frederick T.J. Chiluba.
Undoubtedly, these sentiments created a psychological
feeling in President Kaunda that only he could lead the nation
and provide security to families. It le therefore, plausible
to argue that the Leader Principle within UNIP and the nation
was boosted by the 5 February incident. It was a political
gamble which paid dividends for President Kaunda who did not
only emerge from the crleiB politically stronger, but whose
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image as a symbol of unity gained further weight. Later a
Zambian scholar, Mwisenge S. Tembo wrote regarding President
Kaunda'a brief resignation:
It had very grave potential implications for the
four million people of Zambia at the time. This was
a young and fragile country barely four years old.
It was surrounded by white Rhodesia, racist South
Africa, and white colonial Portuguese Angola and
Mozambique. These regimes would have been more than
jubilant to see turmoil and bloodshed in independent
black Zambia. That would have been ammunition for
these regimes' racist colonial campaigns.3e
The theme that without President Kaunda Zambia would be
plunged into chaos and bloodshed continued to Bustain the
Leader Principle as well as crystallize the ideology of
togetherness. While President Kaunda carefully pursued the
ideology of togetherness, he also tactfully continued to
aeeume those tenants of an autocrat. His life having been
already equated to that of the nation.
As Samuel N. Chipungu noted, "leaders became "saviours',
'godsent' and "liberators'"40 Leaders, especially the
President, could not be questioned or, indeed, expected to be
wrong. Consequently, Zambians "surrendered their right to
make decisions and believed that what was right for the
leaders was equally correct for them".41 A personality cult
had developed and was being unknowingly nurtured by Zamblane
themselves. President Kaunda wae slowly, but surely being
seen as infallible. Slogans were coined which made him appear
demi-god. For example, the slogan Kumulu ni Leea, Panehi ni
Kaunda (In Heaven it is God, On earth it is Kaunda) portrayed
that message.
Autocracy in Zambia was further strengthened in January
1969 following the first general election of December 1968.
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UNIP won an overwhelming majority over ANC in parliamentary
seats. On 22 January the Speaker of the National Assembly
Robinson Nabulyato, refused to recognize the ANC as an
official opposition in the assembly because it was too small a
minority to constitute an official opposition. He argued that
ANC could "form neither a quorum to execute the business of
the House nor a government".42
The decision not to accord the ANC recognition as the
official opposition had serious implications for the role of
the opposition in both parliament and the nation. The
decision ultimately destroyed the democratic process, since
without an officially recognized opposition party Zambia
became a de facto one party state.
Nabulyato'e decision, however, should be understood
within the context of the 1960s when ruling political parties
in Africa were becoming Increasingly intransigent. His
decision was equally influenced by pronouncements by
politicians in the ruling party against those in opposition
parties.43 President Kaunda had on 23 December 1968 warned
that:
I can not see how I can continue to pay a police
officer or civil servant who works for Nkumbula....
How dare they bite the hand that feeds them? They
must learn that it pays to belong to UNIP. Those
who want to form a civil service of the opposition
must cross the floor and get their pay from Harry
Nkumbula.44
President Kaunda further ordered Justin Chimba, then Minister
of Trade, Industry and Mines, to "ensure that none of the
eight opposition MPs elected in Barotee Province was granted a
new licence or had hi6 old licence renewed.40 Unashamedly,
"Kaunda promised...to implement the economic reforms in order
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to show that "it pays to belong to UNIP'"«« He was
obviously behaving like a dictator.
Meanwhile President Kaunda was careful not to appear to
be spearheading the crusade for declaring Zambia a one-party
state. Yet, within months Zambia witnessed maBsive round-ups
of political opponents. And as UNIP prepared for a one-party
Btate, cleavages within UNIP continued to grow. In August
1969 President Kaunda issued a party presidential decree which
dissolved the Central Committee and abolished the post of
party president and vice-president. In their place he created
a temporary National Committee to deal with routine party
affairs.47 He began to call himself Secretary-General of
the Party. From the point of view of Zambia's constitutional
Bet-up, President Kaunda had emerged as a virtual dictator.
He then appointed two conunieBionB, one to redraft the
UNIP constitution (which he blamed for the lack of stability
and efficiency), and another to work on the question of
discipline in the party. The president also reorganized and
changed the relationship between the party and the government.
Henceforth, the party was supreme over the government.
Simon Kapwepwe tendered his resignation as Vice-President
of the party and government the same day saying:
Some of my colleagues and fellow leaders have never
recognized me as a properly elected Vice-PreBident
and have engaged in mud-Blinging in the presB, at
public meetings and in dark corners ... The people
from the northern part of Zambia—the Bemba-speaking
people—have suffered physically .... They have
suffered demotions and suspensions because of my
being Vice-President. I cannot sacrifice any longer
these people.48
However, on August 27, 1969 Kapwepwe withdrew his resignation
from the government and said he would stay on until his term
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expired in August 1970. Meanwhile factionalism continued to
dominate UNIP politlce.
In August 1971 Kapwepwe resigned from the government as
Minister of Provincial and Local Government and Culture, and
became leader of newly formed United Progreeeive Party (UPP).
The UPP epitomised the tendency for intra-party competition in
the guise of regional conflict which culminated in the
secession from UNIP of some skilled politicians. The
defections seriously impaired UNIP'e capability for mobilizing
votes.40
Although UPP was generally a Bemba-dominated party, it
attracted those from UNIP who had always emphasized mass
participation and popular control as opposed to those who
emphasized the importance of unity and control from above ae a
basis for party organization. The former was usually Bemba
dominated while the latter was usually Lozi dominated. This
was the ideological basis for the founding of UPP. The new
party attracted small businesspeople, middle-level civil
servants, local elected councillors and some party militants
from UNIP whose services during the anti-colonial struggle had
seemingly gone unrewarded after 1864. The UPP was strongest
on the Copperbelt. It is in this respect that Gertzel,
Szeftel and Baylies argue that UPP was "an expression and
consequence of competition for limited resources."60
Kapwepwe's resignation had a sobering effect on the UNIP
leadership. A popular politician outside UNIP represented a
real threat. President Kaunda was left with no choice but to
go for the one-party state. What he now needed was a
justification to make hie move. He did not wait very long.
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Because of the violence which followed, which was blamed on
the new party, President Kaunda on 4 February 1972 proscribed
UPP and detained Kapwepwe and one hundred and twenty-three
leading UPP members.01
Kapwepwe was now receiving the same treatment he had
helped to administer on Liso a few years earlier for
challenging President Kaunda's leadership. The women who
demonstrated were often stripped off semi-naked as a gesture
of extreme insult directed at Kapwepwe. Kapwepwe had
difficult holding meetings for his party because the police
often denied his party permits. The police were afraid of
reprisals if they granted permits to UPP.02 Rumours were
widespread that some UNIP members were actually followers of
UPP. Yet, because of the oppressive card-checking campaign by
uniformed UNIP party militants, few publicly supported UPP.
The "It Pays To Belong To UNIP" mentality within UNIP
prevailed. Those without UNIP cards were subjected to serious
abuses of human rights. For instance, women without UNIP
cards were barred from entering markets and shops. In some
cases they were coerced into spending their housekeeping money
on UNIP membership cards. Men without UNIP cards found
themselves walking to and from work as empty buses drove
away.oa
The T-tmen of Znmhin carried a leading Btory about the
harmful effects of the government's approach in dealing with
members of the opposition. The editorials angered President
Kaunda who, in January 1972 decided to replace the Editor-in-
Chief, Danstan Kamana with Vernon Mwaanga, former Zambia's
Permanent Representative to the United Nations.04 He told
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the new Editor-in-Chief that the government did not expect to
be confronted with the same thorn in the flesh.
On February 25 President Kaunda announced the cabinet's
decision to establish a one-party state in Zambia through
constitutional change.B6 A National Commission was eet up
under the Chairmanship of the Vice-President, Mainza Chona, to
recommend necessary changes to the constitution in preparation
for the introduction of the one-party state system. The Chona
Commission reported in October 1972. Public debate was
minimal.
The tenor of the Chona Report "suggested the "liberal'
influence of Zambia's new administrators and entrepreneurs,
rather than the populist influence of the party."60 The
government, therefore, rejected most of the Commission's
recommendations, which would have made Zambia's "one-party
participatory democracy" have some semblance of democracy.
The recommendation that the incumbent president be eligible to
stand for a second five-year term, after which he or she would
not be eligible to stand for office until yet another five-
year period had elapsed, was rejected. The government also
rejected the proposal for an electoral competition between
three presidential candidates. Instead, the government White
Paper67 provided for one presidential candidate who was to
be elected by the party's general conference.
In the end, the constitutional changes which ushered in
the Second Republic reinforced party control over the
presidency, while simultaneously providing for greater
presidential control over the party. Contrary .to President
Kaunda's suggestion in March 1972 that "one-party
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participatory democracy" would end the politics of patronage,
i
the reverse was true. On December 4, 1972 the UNIP National
Council discussed the Chona Report and accepted the Government
White Paper on it. On December B, by a vote of 78 to none,
the National Assembly approved the second and third reading of
the Constitutional Amendment Bill prohibiting all opposition
parties. It established the ruling UNIP as the.country's sole
legal party.08 President Kaunda signed the Bill on December
13 at a ceremony to mark its enactment.08
Under this Bill, no person was allowed to attempt to form
a political party or organization other than UNIP. Further, no
one was allowed to "belong to or assemble, associate, express
opinion or do anything in sympathy with any such political
party or organization."80 While President Kaunda had in
September 1963 openly turned down a proposition that he become
Life President of UNIP (and Ipeo facto of Zambia),81 the
constitutional changes which ushered in the one-party state
made him a de facto Life President. The current slogan was
"ONE ZAMBIA ONE NATION; ONE NATION ONE LEADER, THAT LEADER
KAUNDA WAMUYAYAYA."e2 President Kaunda never objected to
the slogan. In fact he always began his political speeches by
starting the slogan and letting hi6 audience carry it to its
logical conclusion.
Attempts 'by Nkumbula, Kapwepwe and Robert Chiluwe (a
Lusaka businessman), in 1978 to challenge President Kaunda for
the presidency were shattered when, by a show of hands, UNIP
delegates at Mulungushi approved constitutional amendments.
The most crucial amendment was the new requirement that a
candidate for the post of president should have been a member
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of UNIP for at least five yeare, with no criminal record.
Such an aspirant also needed twenty supporters from each
province amonget the delegates at the party congress.
The amendment effectively disqualified the three
independent contestants.33 Nkumbula had Just joined UNIP
following the dissolution of ANC. Kapwepwe remained outBide
UNIP since the dayB of his United Progressive Party which was
banned in 1971. Chiluwe could not manage to raise the
required number of supporters. Further more, Chiluwe was
declared bankrupt after his bank accounts were frozen. By the
law, therefore, he could not stand for the presidency or,
indeed, any other public office. Within months Chiluwe was so
pauperised that he could hardly afford bus fares. That is the
price he paid for attempting to challenge President Kaunda.
The High Court turned down Kapwepwe and Nkumbula's appeal
against their disqualification on 16 November 1978, thereby
leaving President Kaunda as the only presidential candidate.
He was subsequently elected with an 80.5 per cent vote of the
total votes cast in a 66.7 percent poll.6'* President Kaunda
had effectively become autocratic and repulsive of any
democratic processes in the party and the nation.
President Kaunda's authority was further strengthened
because he wae seem as the only one in Zambia capable of
securing allegiance from all the 73 tribes in the country.
Having launched the one-party state, President Kaunda found
himself with the task of performing a balancing act between
UNIP old guards and new members from former opposition
parties. Nkumbula Joined UNIP following the signing of the
Choma Declaration in June 1973.eo President Kaunda appeared
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secure, but silently worried about Kapwepwe's refusal to Join
UNIP.
While President Kaunda may have emerged as an autocrat,
he was unquestionably helped by the behaviour of some cabinet
ministers who more often than not showed extreme caution
towards, decision making. Because of too much consultation,
they inadvertently concentrated political power in President
Kaunda's hands. Earlier in his rule President Kaunda was
willing to delegate, but his ministers were reluctant to take
initiative.68 No man can be a dictator alone. President
Kaunda was surrounded by over zealous sycophants who went out
of their way to show loyalty to the party and the President in
particular.
The notorious uniformed party militants were allowed by
the UNIP leadership to mete out punishment to anyone accused
of disrespect for the party leadership. These individuals
terrorised people at bus stops, at markets, shops and even at
places of work. They were above reproach. UNIP, particularly
under the one-party state rule, gave them a silent
encouragement. Examples of their activities are many. Aa
late as 1990, the party militants were still very active.
In January 1990 an Assistant Registrar in charge of
Personnel at the University of Zambia became a victim of the
party militants.e7 He was forcibly removed from his office
at the University of Zambia and carried to a waiting van. He
was then driven to the Civic Centre. His fate followed a
report that he had relieved a University employee of her
duties for constantly leaving her office to attend to party
matters. The employee involved WSB, at the time, Women's
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League Ward Chairperson, and Trustee of the University of
Zambia Allied Workers Union. At the Civic Centre the
Assistant Registrar was told that what sacked worker was doing
while attending party meetings was more important than what he
did at the University.es He was therefore ordered to
reinstate her and told that "what you should know ie that the
University exists because of the party and you are supposed to
respect it".6e
Similar incidents are plenty in Zambia,B political
history, particularly during the one party-state era. Because
party militants helped to Bustain the autocratic rule by
President Kaunda, they were not disciplined for their actions
against administrators who tried to enforce discipline at
places of work. In fact, party militants were the law onto
themselves. No one dared to challenge them, at least not
openly.
The Df-mi BR of Autocracy
Throughout the period that UNIP was in power, more
especially since 1968 when election of party leaders produced
disaffection, the par*ty did away with elections. This
reluctance to hold free and fair elections for party posts
remained perhaps the single moet important evidence of lack of
democracy in UNIP. Most UNIP leaders were uncomfortable with
the idea of challenging President Kaunda for the presidency.
He was perceived ae the only one in the country who was best
suited to rule Zambia.70
However, the transformation in the country's demography
changed the way such opinions were perceived. Ae more and
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more ZambianB became permanently urbanised, and as the rural-
urban linkB became weaker, people looked more to the state for
Burvival. Initially the state was able to meet the needs of
the urbanites through the policy of subsidising food and other
societal requisites. However, as the long economic depression
which began in the mid 1970s worsened in the 1980s, moat
urbanitea became disillusioned with government performance.
While it had been easy to satisfy the rural population, the
urbanites were more difficult to buy off. The unemployed
youthful urbanitee became a source of worry for the Kaunda
government. Several schemes were developed but they all
failed to successfully solve the problem. Because of
frustration, the urbanites became easily involved in food
riots which rocked the late 1980s. These culminated in the
June 1990 food riot which precipitated the Luchembe coup
attempt.71 It was this coup attempt which effectively broke
President Kaunda's grip to power and led to the formation of a
pressure group, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).
Faced with these mounting challenges,-President Kaunda
felt insecure, vulnerable and excessively sensitive to
criticism. Times had changed. ZambianB had also changed
their allegiance. They were more supportive of the ideas
about the need to remove the one-party state system. MMD
political rallies attracted thousands of people. Lees and
lees people openly supported UNIP. Even the notorious
uniformed party militants were no longer as forceful as was
the case a few months earlier. Most had switched sides and
were looking forward to change.
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More importantly perhaps, the collapse of autocracy in
Zambia can be better understood when one takes into account
the fact that some leading members of the UNIP Central
Committee declined to stand for re-appointment during the 1991
UNIP Mulungushi extraordinary conference. ThoBe who offered
to etep down include Elijah Mudenda, Reuben Kamanga and Gray
Zulu. Obviously, the retirement of these seasoned UNIP
politicians from active politics extremely weakened Preeident
Kaunda's hold to political power. His efforts to replace them
with young inexperienced leaders failed to sustain him in the
position of power.
Furthermore, some of the more experienced politicians had
already identified themselves with the MMD. People like H.
Mulemba, the- former UNIP Secretary General and then Zambia's
High Commissioner to Canada, had since 1988 become an MP and
increasingly critical of UNIP policies. He was among the
first MPs to move over to the MMD and was indeed a founder
member of MMD. The MMD also gathered further support from
most of those who had suffered humiliation during the one-
party state era. Even the recently pardoned coup plotters
like Edward Shamwana supported the MMD.
President Kaunda's position was evidently weakened. -Just
as the Zambians had created and defined autocratic President
Kaunda, they unmade the autocrat by simply denying him the
support he always enjoyed. Consequently, from an
uncompromising refusal to change from one-party Btate to
pluralism, President Kaunda began to soften. He announced
that there would be a referendum to decide whether or not
Zambia should return to plural politics. Yet, as pressure
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mounted, this wae abandoned. Instead a national election was
called for October 1991. UNIP and the MMD (which had been
transformed into a political party) were to participate. This
followed the change in the constitution to allow opposition
parties to legally operate in Zambia.
With this newly found freedom, several other partieB
emerged. The most important being the MMD and UNIP. During
the October 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections MMD
overwhelmingly defeated UNIP. F.T.J. Chiluba was elected
president, and on 1st November 1991 he was sworn in as
Zambia's second republican president.
Chiluba's accession to the political throne in Zambia's
political history marked the end of an era—the end of the
long dawn—according to The KcnnomiRt.7^ xhe twenty years
of autocracy has also taught Zambians one major lesson.
Zambians will never again surrender their political rights to
one individual. Thus the success or failure of liberal
democracy to day would depend on whether or not Zambians
internalized the problems of one-party rule. In another
decade or so, some one will be able to chronical the
experience of the Third Republic. This paper has,
nonetheless, shown that the concentration of political power
in President Kaunda's hands was only possible because the
people made it possible. The Zambian society hero-worshipped
the president so much that with time, they managed to make an
autocrat out of an otherwise democrat. With the return to
liberal democracy, it is hopped that Zambians will guard
against creating another autocrat out of President Chiluba by
avoiding hero-worehipping him as they did President Kaunda.
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